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COMMENTS
THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN ACT SINCE 1975
The concept of public education emerged as an essential
component of American society at the time of the Industrial
Revolution.1 It was not until 1954, however, that it was deter-
mined that such an education, when provided by a state, must
be made available on equal terms to all individuals. 2 Twenty
years later the United States Congress took steps to guarantee
the availability of a public education to handicapped children
with its enactment of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 (EHA or "the Act").3 This Comment
will address four separate aspects of the EHA. Part I will set
forth the history of the Act. Part II will analyze its intent.
Part III will concentrate on the Act's substantive and proce-
dural requirements. Finally, Part IV will look at a few prob-
1. J. HOGAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC INTERtsr 1 (1974).
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the public benefit of educating a child was virtually
nil.
With the coming of the Industrial Revolution, however, major changes occurred
in the family's functions, both as an economic unit and as the training grounds
for children. As work organizations developed outside of the family, children
became occupationally mobile and sought employment in manufacturing, com-
mercial, or business enterprises. Just as families lost much of their self-sus-
taining productivity function, so also they lost many of their welfare functions,
including the primary responsibility for training children. As a result of these
societal developments, the education and training a child received came to be of
interest to all of the people in the community, not just to his prospective employ-
ers, for without an adequate education he might someday become dependent
upon them for his support. Few people in these early times ever thought of an
"equal educational opportunity"; rather, the need was for a "general educational
opportunity" that provided adequate training or schooling to enable the child in
later life to perform some productive and self-supporting role in society. In sum,
the public interest served by education emerged when children and men began to
employ their labor outside the family, and this "paved the way for public
education."
Id. For a general discussion of legal issues pertaining to public education, see E. REUT-
TER, JR. & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
2. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
3. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400-61 (1982)).
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lem areas which have arisen in the ten years since the Act's
implementation, and discuss possible modes of response.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE EHA
In Brown v. Board of Education,4 the United States
Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of state laws per-
mitting or requiring the segregation of white and black chil-
dren in public schools. 5  "This segregation was alleged to
deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under
the Fourteenth Amendment."6 At the lower court levels, a
"separate but equal" doctrine was consistently applied, result-
ing in a supposedly constitutional equality of treatment be-
cause "the races [were] provided substantially equal
facilities," even though the facilities were separate.7
The Supreme Court concluded that the "separate but
equal" doctrine had no place in the field of public education
due to the inherent inequality of intangible educational con-
siderations." In view of this, the Court determined that a state
which has undertaken to provide the opportunity of educa-
tion9 must do so "to all on equal terms" 10 in order to comply
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See id. at 488. See Note, Supreme Court Equity Discretion: The Decrees in the
Segregation Cases, 64 YALE L. J. 124 (1954), for a discussion of Brown and its compan-
ion case, Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
6. 347 U.S. at 488. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in part:
No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
7. 347 U.S. at 488. The plaintiffs contended that segregated public schools were
not "equal" and could not be made "equal." Therefore, they argued, the "separate but
equal" doctrine deprived them of equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth
amendment. See id.
8. See id. at 492-95. The Court discussed various intangible considerations, includ-
ing the ability to study with other students, the opportunity for open discussions and
exchanges of views, the feeling of inferiority which results from segregation, and the
psychological impact segregation has on the educational and mental development of
black children.
9. The United States Supreme Court has never held that the right to a public edu-
cation is a fundamental right, that is, one secured by the federal Constitution. See, e.g.,
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), reh'g denied, 411 U.S.
959 (1973). Therefore, the equal educational opportunity doctrine only applies to states
which have undertaken to provide public education. See Alschuler, Education for the
Handicapped, 7 J. L. & EDUC. 523, 524-26 (1978).
10. 347 U.S. at 493.
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with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."1
Despite the Court's pronouncement in Brown, it was still
many years before the equal educational opportunity doctrine
was applied specifically to handicapped children.12 The
United States Congress first took action in this regard with an
amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1966.13 Thereafter, Congress began to realize the necessity
of providing financial, in addition to procedural, assistance to
the states for the improvement of handicapped programs. 14 In
response to this concern, Congress repealed the handicapped
provisions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1966 and created a separate Education of the Handicapped
Act in 1970.15 This act authorized the availability of financial
grants to states to assist in "initiating, expanding and improv-
ing programs for the education of handicapped children." 16
Increased recognition of the right of handicapped children
to a public education prompted many parents to challenge the
constitutionality of restrictive state regulations. As a result,
the courts began to accept "the fact that handicapped children
[had] been in a disadvantaged position similar to that of other
11. Id. at 495.
12. See R. MARTIN, EDUCATING HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 11-13 (1979), for a
discussion of two reasons behind the exclusion of handicapped children from public
schools: "The first was that the persons being injured were not recognized as having
rights that they could complain about. The second was a rigid definition of education."
Id. at 11.
13. See Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966). See also the Senate report
on the EHA where it discusses the 1966 amendments:
Prior to that time, the Federal Government had done little to assist in the educa-
tion of handicapped children, and the effectiveness of existing programs was dis-
sipated by the lack of a single strong administrative body. The Bureau of
Education for the Handicapped was established by this law in order to provide
the leadership necessary in this field.
S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1425, 1429.
14. See S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 5, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1425, 1429.
15. See Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970).
16. S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 5, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 1429.
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minorities and that educational opportunity is their legal
right." 17
In 1971, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Chil-
dren (PARC) prevailed over the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania in what is now considered to be the landmark case
pertaining to the right to education of handicapped children. '8
Prior to the PARC decision, children in Pennsylvania could be
excluded from public schools if they were certifiably unable to
benefit from education. 19 The PARC case resulted in a con-
sent decree recognizing the legal right to public education on
the part of handicapped children, as guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment equal protection clause.2"
One month after the resolution of PARC, a class action
was filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia
alleging that the exclusion of handicapped children from pub-
licly supported education was unconstitutional. 21 To reach its
decision, the district court in Mills v. Board of Education of
17. S. GOLDBERG, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 2 (1982). See also R. MARTIN,
supra note 12, at 13-16.
18. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257
(E.D. Pa. 1971). See S. GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 2-3; see also R. MARTIN, supra
note 12, at 13-14; see generally Note, Education: The Right of Retarded Children to
Receive an Education Suited to Their Needs, 77 DICK. L. REv. 577 (1973), for a discus-
sion of PARC and Mills v. Board of Educ. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), (discussed
infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text).
19. See 334 F. Supp. at 1262.
20. See id. at 1259-60. The district court concluded:
Expert testimony in this action indicates that all mentally retarded persons are
capable of benefiting from a program of education and training; that the greatest
number of retarded persons, given such education and training, are capable of
achieving self-sufficiency, and the remaining few, with such education and train-
ing, are capable of achieving some degree of self-care; that the earlier such edu-
cation and training begins, the more thoroughly and the more efficiently a
mentally retarded person will benefit from it; and, whether begun early or not,
that a mentally retarded person can benefit at any point in his life and develop-
ment from a program of education and training.
Id. at 1259. Because Pennsylvania provided a free public education to all regular and
exceptional children aged 6 through 21, the court reasoned that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibited the state from denying "any mentally
retarded child access to a free public program of education and training," the need for
which is demonstrated above. Id. at 1259.
The United States Supreme Court relied on the fourteenth amendment and similar
reasoning in the Brown decision 17 years earlier. See supra text accompanying note 11.
21. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). See Note, supra
note 18, for a discussion of the Mills case. See generally Note, Mills v. Board of Educ.,
52 B.U.L. REV. 884 (1972).
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District of Columbia22 relied on the holdings of Brown23 and
an earlier District of Columbia District Court case, Hobson v.
Hansen,2" in addition to its interpretation of federal regula-
tions and the United States Constitution. 25 The court con-
cluded that the Board of Education of the District of
Columbia must not only provide an equal education for hand-
icapped children,26 but also afford a "constitutionally ade-
quate prior hearing and periodic review of their status,
progress, and the adequacy of any educational alternatives. '27
After the successful conclusions of PARC and Mills,
thirty-six additional right-to-education suits were filed on be-
half of handicapped children.28 It thus became increasingly
apparent to Congress that the time had come for the federal
government to establish detailed standards pertaining to the
22. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874-75.
24. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). The court in Hobson found the denial to poor
public school children of the educational opportunities available to more affluent public
school children unconstitutional:
From these considerations the court draws the conclusion that the doctrine of
equal educational opportunity - the equal protection clause in its application to
public school education - is in its full sweep a component of due process binding
on the [school] District under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 493 (footnote omitted).
25. See 348 F. Supp. at 873. The court stated: "Plaintiffs' entitlement to relief in
this case is clear. The applicable statutes and regulations and the Constitution of the
United States require it." Id.
26. See id. at 874. The court determined:
Thus the Board of Education has an obligation to provide whatever specialized
instruction that will benefit the child. By failing to provide plaintiffs and their
class the publicly supported specialized education to which they are entitled, the
Board of Education violates the above statutes and its own regulations.
Id.
27. Id. at 878. The court further discussed:
The defendants are required by the Constitution of the United States, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Code, and their own regulations to provide a publicly-sup-
ported education for these "exceptional" children. Their failure to fulfill this
clear duty to include and retain these children in the public school system, or
otherwise provide them with publicly-supported education, and their failure to
afford them due process hearing and periodical review, cannot be excused by the
claim that there are insufficient funds.
Id. at 876. The issue of insufficient funding is discussed in more detail infra note 39 and
accompanying text. See S. GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 3-4; see also R. MARTIN, supra
note 12, at 14-15.
28. R. MARTIN, supra note 12, at 15. See generally S. GOLDBERG, supra note 17,
19851
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education of handicapped children.29 Congress' first response
was the enactment of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.30 This section outlawed handicap-based discrimination
in any program, including public education, which received
direct or indirect federal financial assistance.31
Section 504 was not sufficiently clear regarding its applica-
bility to public education, however. 32  This prompted Con-
gress to act in a more specific manner. In 1974, an interim
statute was enacted 33 to enable Congress to analyze the handi-
capped situation.34 "The ensuing year of study culminated in
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,''35
29. See S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 5-6, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 1429-30.
30. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355 (1973)(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982)).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) provides in part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
• ..this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service ....
Federal regulations promulgated pursuant to § 504, adopted in 1977, were originally
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1984). They now exist at 34 C.F.R. § 104 (1984) and pro-
vide for enforcement by the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education. See
generally S. GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 4, 189-223; R. MARTIN, supra note 12, at 17-
20.
32. See R. MARTIN, supra note 12, at 18.
33. Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380,
§§ 611-21, 88 Stat. 579 (1974).
34. One author observed:
Dissatisfied with the progress being made under these earlier enactments, and
spurred by two district court decisions holding that handicapped children should
be given access to a public education, Congress in 1974 greatly increased federal
funding for education of the handicapped and for the first time required recipient
States to adopt "a goal of providing full educational opportunities to all handi-
capped children." The 1974 statute was recognized as an interim measure only,
adopted "in order to give the Congress an additional year in which to study what
if any additional Federal assistance [was] required to enable the states to meet
the needs of handicapped children."
Comment, A Modern Wilderness - The Law of Education for the Handicapped, 34 MER-
CER L. REv. 1045, 1050 (1983) (citing the Education of the Handicapped Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 579, 582 (1974), and H.R. Rep. No. 332, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975)).
35. Comment, supra note 34, at 1050. The Act was embodied within Pub. L. No.
94-142, 89 Stat. 774 (1975)(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1982)).
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and the promulgation of implemental regulations by the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare in 1977.36
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT
At the time the EHA was enacted, only about half of the
nation's eight million handicapped children were receiving an
education appropriate to their developmental needs. Prior
legislative and judicial actions taken at both the state and na-
tional levels, while having resulted in some progress, had
failed to adequately establish an equal and complete educa-
tional system for handicapped children.38 At the root of this
developmental lag was the insufficiency or total unavailabil-
ity39 of the financial resources necessary to assure handi-
capped children a "free appropriate public education."'
Although it had been held that "the lack of funding [could]
not be used as an excuse for failing to provide educational
36. Originally codified at 45 C.F.R. § 121a these regulations now exist at 34
C.F.R. § 300 (1984).
37. See S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 1432. The Senate report utilized statistics provided by the Bureau of
Education for the Handicapped pertaining to children between birth and twenty-one
years of age.
38. See id. at 7-8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1431-32.
See also Comment, supra note 34, at 1048-50. See generally Haggerty & Sacks, Educa-
tion of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP.
L.Q. 961, 961-84 (1977).
39. See S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1432. The Senate report identified inadequate funding as the basis of both
inappropriate and nonexistent educational services to handicapped children. See infra
notes 45, 47-49 and accompanying text.
See also Comment, supra note 34, at 1050, in which the author stated: "Congress
passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act [of 1975] in response to its
perception that a majority of this nation's handicapped children 'were either totally
excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time
when they were old enough to "drop out."' '" Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 332, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975)). The Act therefore provided that the necessary "federal
money may be expended to assist state and local agencies in educating handicapped
children, and conditions this assistance upon a state's compliance with extensive goals
and procedures."
40. See S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1432. The term "free appropriate public education" appears extensively
throughout the EHA. Its interpretation has been the subject of much debate and litiga-
tion. See infra notes 115-47 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion in
this regard.
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services,''41 in many instances it became financially impossible
for the states to implement the services required.42
Public Law No. 94-142 was therefore proposed "to estab-
lish and protect the right to education for all handicapped
children and to provide assistance to the States in carrying out
their responsibilities under State law and the Constitution of
the United States to provide equal protection of the laws." 43
As the constitutional right to a public education on the part of
handicapped children was not in issue,44 it is clear that the
overall intent of the EHA was primarily one of financial
assistance.4 5
41. S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 1432. See Mills v. Board of Educ. 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972). But
cf infra note 133 and accompanying text.
42. See S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 7-8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 1431-32. See also Comment, supra note 34, at 1050.
43. S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 13, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1437. See generally Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Edu-
cation: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARv. L. REV.
1103, 1103-08 (1979).
44. See supra notes 9 & 20 and accompanying text for a discussion of a state's
constitutional obligation to provide an equal educational opportunity to handicapped
children.
45. See S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 1-2, 7-9, 13-14, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1425-26, 1431-33, 1437-38.
The Senate report discussed the effect of insufficient funding and remedial assistance
on handicapped education programs:
The long range implications . . . are that public agencies and taxpayers will
spend billions of dollars over the lifetimes of these individuals to maintain such
persons as dependents and in a minimally acceptable lifestyle. With proper edu-
cation services, many would be able to become productive citizens, contributing
to society instead of being forced to remain burdens. Others, through such serv-
ices, would increase their independence, thus reducing their dependence on soci-
ety.
There is no pride in being forced to receive economic assistance. Not only
does this have negative effects upon the handicapped person, but it has far reach-
ing effects for such person's family.
Providing educational services will ensure against persons needlessly being
forced into institutional settings. One need only look at public residential insti-
tutions to find thousands of persons whose families are no longer able to care for
them and who themselves have received no educational services. Billions of dol-
lars are expended each year to maintain persons in these subhuman conditions.
This Nation has long embraced a philoshophy [sic] that the right to a free appro-
priate public education is basic to equal opportunity and is vital to secure the
future and the prosperity of our people. It is contradictory to that philosophy
when that right is not assured equally to all groups of people within the Nation.
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Tlie Senate subcommittee examining the proposed legisla-
tion delineated six distinct purposes of the Act.4 These six
objectives coupled the intent of financial assistance with the
overriding concern for guaranteeing a free appropriate public
education to all handicapped children.47
In the first place, the Act was designed to "focus the distri-
bution of funds to the States based on an incentive formula
related to the actual delivery of services by a time certain to
all handicapped children. 4 8  The new entitlement formula
provided for payments based on the number of handicapped
children eligible to receive services and a percentage of the
incremental cost of educating a handicapped child above the
average pupil expenditure in a public school system.4 9
Certainly the failure to provide a right to education to handicapped children
cannot be allowed to continue.
Parents of handicapped children all too frequently are not able to advocate
the rights of their children because they have been erroneously led to believe that
their children will not be able to lead meaningful lives. However, over the past
few years, parents of handicapped children have begun to recognize that their
children are being denied services which are guaranteed under the Constitution.
It should not, however, be necessary for parents throughout the country to con-
tinue utilizing the courts to assure themselves a remedy. It is this Committee's
belief that the Congress must take a more active role under its responsibility for
equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped children are provided
equal educational opportunity. It can no longer be the policy of the Government
to merely establish an unenforceable goal requiring all children to be in school.
S. 6 takes positive necessary steps to ensure that the rights of children and their
families are protected.
Id. at 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1433.
46. See id. at 13-14, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1437-38.
47. See Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 38, at 984-93.
48. S. Rep. No. 168 supra note 13, at 13-14, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 1437-38.
49. See id. at 14-15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1438-39.
The Senate Report provided:
The Committee has adopted this formula in order to provide an incentive to
States to serve all handicapped children and to assure that the entitlement is
based on the number of children actually receiving special education and related
services within the State and for whom the State or the local educational agency
is paying for such education. It has, however, adopted a formula which assures
stability in payment to States so that funds in each succeeding fiscal year will at
least be equal to those received in the prior fiscal year.
Id. The Senate and the House differed as to the exact provisions of the formula to be
adopted. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1480, 1485. The Senate bill provided for financial assistance
to each state of an amount equal to the number of children entitled to services multi-
1985]
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The second stated objective of the EHA involved assuring
"a priority in delivery of services to handicapped children
most in need, i.e., those handicapped children who are not
receiving educational services and those handicapped children
with the most severe handicaps currently receiving an inade-
quate education. ' 50  Targeting funds at the children most in
need of services was perceived as an essential prerequisite to
providing a full educational opportunity to all handicapped
children within the timetable prescribed by the Act.5'
"[T]o provide an orderly process in the extension of ser-
vice delivery," with "emphasis on providing early identifica-
tion and assessment," was the third identified purpose of the
EHA.52 The early identification of handicapping conditions
and timely implementation of corrective services were thought
plied by $300. This was based on a study done by the National Education Finance
Project which estimated that,
the actual cost of educating a handicapped child is on the average, double the
cost of educating a non-handicapped child. While this estimate may vary by
State, the dollar level of $300 in the Committee bill represents an amount ap-
proximately equal to 25 percent of such additional cost and will provide an
amount per handicapped child which will assist States and local educational
agencies in providing appropriate education for handicapped children.
S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 1439. The House amendments, on the other hand, provided:
The maximum amount of the grant which a State is entitled to receive in any
fiscal year is equal to the number of handicapped children aged three to twenty-
one, inclusive, in such State who are receiving special education and related serv-
ices multiplied by a specified percentage of the average per pupil expenditure in
public elementary and secondary schools in the United States ...
S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-455, supra note 49 at 33, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1486-87. The specific percentages increased yearly from 5 percent during
fiscal year 1978 to 40 percent for fiscal year 1982 and each subsequent year. This com-
pares to the across-the-board 25 percent encompassed within the Senate version. It was
the House's proposal which was incorporated into the final version of the EHA. See 20
U.S.C. § 1411(a) (1) (1982).
50. S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 14, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1438. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1982).
51. See S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 1439. The timetables incorporated within the Act mandate the availa-
bility of a free appropriate public education to all handicapped children aged 3 to 21 no
later than September 1, 1980. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2) (B) (1982). See also Haggerty &
Sacks, supra note 38, at 987-90.
52. S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 14, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
A.D. NEWS at 1438. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412-14 (1982).
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to be critical to the avoidance of further delays in a child's
educational development. 3
The fourth objective of the EHA was to "provide and rein-
force procedural protections for parents and children in all
matters relating to the educational process."' 54 These proce-
dural safeguards, the Act's cornerstone for the protection of
handicapped rights, not only mandate increased parental
awareness, but also enable both parent and child to challenge
every aspect of the child's education:55
Concerns about the discriminatory treatment which char-
acteristically results from the identification of a handicapping
condition, 6 and the danger of inadequate or inappropriate
programs which could result from an erroneous classifica-
tion,5 7 formed the basis of the fifth purpose of the Act. This
was to "focus directly on the problem of erroneous classifica-
tion and labelling of children by setting a limitation on the
population of children who may be counted as eligible for
services, strengthening procedural guarantees, and providing a
mechanism for compliance evaluation and investigation of
complaints. '5 8
Finally, the EHA was designed to "assure sole responsibil-
ity for the education of all handicapped children by the State
53. See S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 18, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 1442. For discussion of the schools' affirmative duty to provide a free
public education to handicapped children, see also R. MARTIN, supra note 12, at 27-43.
54. S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 14, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1438. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982).
55. S. GOLDBERG, supra note 18, at 32-36. R. MARTni, supra note 12, at 97-120.
For a detailed discussion of the procedural protections provided, see infra notes 93-110
and accompanying text.
56. See S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 27, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 1451. See Alschuler, supra note 9, at 533-35.
57. See S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 26-27, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1450-51. See also Alschuler, supra note 9, at 534-35; Haggerty
& Sacks, supra note 38, at 986.
58. S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 14, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 1438. Congress adopted a limitation of "12 per centum of the number of
all children aged five to seventeen" in each state as the maximum number eligible for
special services. 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (a) (5) (A) (i) (1982).
A limitation on the number of children who could be considered handicapped for
the purpose of receiving aid was apparently necessary not only for preventing the erro-
neous classification of children, see S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 28, reprinted in
1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1452, but also for guaranteeing proper expen-
diture of federal funds. See generally id. at 14-15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 1438-39.
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educational agency."5 9 This provision was specifically in-
cluded to cure what Congress considered to be an abdication
of responsibility on the part of various state agencies. 60
Congress relied upon its spending power 6 1 to accomplish
the foregoing goals in Public Law No. 94-142.62 Therefore,
although the Act is not fundamentally binding upon the
states,63 the requirements of the EHA have achieved nearly
uniform implementation, both substantively and procedurally,
throughout the nation.'
III. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE EHA
The EHA necessarily encompasses a wide variety of im-
plemental provisions. 65 However, to the parents of a handi-
capped child, two specific elements of the Act have been
paramount to the educational development of their child.66
First, the EHA guarantees a standard of education commen-
surate with the child's educational needs.67 Second, the Act
provides a foundation of procedural safeguards which allows
parents the right to participate in and challenge their child's
placement.68
59. S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 14, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1438.
60. See id. at 24, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1448. The
Senate report observed that "[w]hile ... different agencies may, in fact, deliver serv-
ices, the responsibility must remain in a central agency overseeing the education of
handicapped children, so that failure to deliver services or the violation of the rights of
handicapped children is squarely the responsibility of one agency." Id. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(6) (1982) for the implementation of this intent.
61. The EHA has been described as a "categorical assistance grant program, which
has the unique characteristic of voluntary participation. To encourage the states to
meet the ambitious objectives of the Act, Congress provided federal funds to both state
and local educational agencies." Comment, supra note 34, at 1052.
62. 89 Stat. 774 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1982)).
63. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
64. Note, Rowley: The Court's First Interpretation of the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 941, 948 (1983).
65. See, eg., 20 U.S.C. § 1402 (1982) (establishing the Bureau for Education and
Training of the Handicapped); id. § 1404 (federal funding for the construction of handi-
capped facilities); id. § 1405 (employment of handicapped individuals); id. § 1415 (pro-
cedural safeguards); id. § 1420 (state payments).
66. See Note, supra note 43, at 1103.
67. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1) (1982). All handicapped children are guaranteed a
free public education appropriate to their educational needs. For a definition of "free
appropriate public education" see infra note 72.
68. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982).
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Although each state is responsible for devising its own
legal requirements pertaining to the education of handicapped
children,69 compliance with the federal law and regulations is
still necessary in order for a state to receive financial assist-
ance.7" It is the federal format, then, that will be discussed in
the following pages.
A. Free Appropriate Public Education
Section 1412 of the Act mandates that a state shall have
"in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the
right to a free appropriate public education" if that state is to
qualify for federal funding.71 Although the Act does define a
"free appropriate public education" (FAPE),72 it is the regula-
tions which delineate the step-by-step method for guarantee-
ing one.73
In this regard, extensive evaluation and placement proce-
dures are provided which must be followed strictly and up-
dated frequently.74 When a handicapped child75 moves into a
69. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 115.76-.89 (1984); Wis. ADMiN. CODE § PI 11.01-.35
(1984).
70. See 20 U.S.C. § 1419(a)-(c) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (1984).
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1982). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.121 (1984). See infra
notes 115-47 for a discussion of the ambiguity resulting from this requirement.
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982) provides:
The term 'free appropriate public education' means special education and related
services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervi-
sion and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State edu-
cational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary
school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with
the individualized education program under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
See infra note 77 for the definition of an "individualized education program." See gen-
erally R. MARTIN, supra note 12, at 57-75.
73. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.1 (1984) which provides:
The purpose of this part is: (a) To insure that all handicapped children have
available to them a free appropriate public education which includes special edu-
cation and related services to meet their unique needs, (b) To insure that the
rights of handicapped children and their parents are protected, (c) To assist
States and localities to provide for the education of all handicapped children, and
(d) To assess and insure the effectiveness of efforts to educate those children.
See also id. §§ 300.300-.349, 300.500-.589.
74. 34 C.F.R. § 300.341(a) (1984) dictates that "[t]he State educational agency
shall insure that each public agency develops and implements an individualized educa-
tion program for each of its handicapped children." Additionally, "at the beginning of
each school year thereafter, each public agency shall have in effect an individualized
education program for every handicapped child who is receiving special education from
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particular school distict or "comes of age" within the meaning
of the Act,76 the first step is the development of an individual-
ized education program (IEP).17 The IEP then forms the ba-
that agency." Id. § 300.342(a). To "be in effect" does not mean the individualized
education program must be reviewed and updated at the beginning of each school year.
Rather, it means that the program
(1)has been developed properly (Le. at a meeting(s) involving all of the partici-
pants specified in the Act (parent, teacher, agency representative, and, where
appropriate, the child)); (2) is regarded by both the parents and agency as appro-
priate in terms of the child's needs, specified goals and objectives, and the serv-
ices to be provided; and (3) will be implemented as written.
Department of Education Policy Interpretation: IEP Requirements, 1 E.H.L.R. 103:46
(1981) (Question #3) (hereinafter IEP Requirements).
Therefore, the only requirement is that "[m]eetings must be conducted at least once
each year to review and, if necessary, revise each handicapped child's IEP." Id. These
meetings may be held at any time during the year, however. Id. at 103:47 (Question
#9). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (a)(5) (1982).
75. Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1) (1982), "[t]he term 'handicapped children'
means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped,
seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired chil-
dren, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require spe-
cial education and related services." See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(a) (1984).
The meaning of each of the elements within the Act's definition is provided by 34
C.F.R. § 300.5(b) (1984). While generally considered to be quite broad in scope, a "key
element of most of these definitions is that the handicapping condition 'adversely affects
educational performance.'" Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education: The Effect of
Scarce Resources on the Implementation of Pub. L. No. 94-142, 14 CONN. L. REV. 477,
481 (1982) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (8) (i) (1981)).
76. "Each State shall insure that free appropriate public education is available...
to all handicapped children aged three through twenty-one within the State. ... 34
C.F.R. § 300.300(a) (1984).
77. The Act defines an individualized education program as follows:
The term 'individualized education program' means a written statement for each
handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of the local edu-
cational agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to
provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the
unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian of
such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which statement shall in-
clude (A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such
child, (B) a statement of annual goals including short-term instructional objec-
tives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such
child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular
educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated dura-
tion of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation proce-
dures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether
instructional objectives are being achieved.
20 U.S.C. § 1401 (19) (1982). See infra notes 83-91 for a discussion of the IEP state-
ment elements. See also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.340 and 300.346 (1984). See generally R.
MARTIN, supra note 12, at 89-95.
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sis and substance of the child's placement, acting as an
educational directive to those who will be teaching him.78
The local education association is responsible for initiating
and conducting the meetings at which the IEP is developed.79
The child's parents may rightfully attend these meetings,
along with various school officials and evaluation personnel.80
Specific requirements exist to assure both parental participa-
tion81 and the proper utilization of evaluation techniques.82
78. As one author observed:
The actual services received by an individual child are not specifically prescribed
by the Act, but result instead from a consensus arrived at during the IEP confer-
ence, or from a decision reached by a judge or hearing officer. Congress adopted
this approach for several reasons, the most obvious of which is the immense
variety of special needs presented by children with different handicaps. A deaf
child has special needs quite unlike those of a mentally retarded child. Even the
single label 'mentally retarded' encompasses a broad spectrum of widely diver-
gent needs. A system of regulations that prescribed a specific program for each
type of handicap would inevitably ignore important differences among individu-
als. Another explanation for congressional reluctance to adopt more specific
guidelines is the lack of agreement among educators as to what programs are
most effective for certain handicapped children. The lack of consensus indicates
some need for flexibility and experimentation at the local level.
Perhaps the most significant reason Congress failed to prescribe more specific
standards is the traditional notion that education is primarily a state and local
concern.. . . In the end, the hard choices required to determine the extent of
the rights of particular children were consigned to the discretion of local admin-
istrators and to the judges and hearings officers who review their decisions.
Note, supra note 43, at 1108-09 (footnotes omitted). See infra notes 116-47 and accom-
panying text for current issues relating to educational programs.
79. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(a)(1984). In the event that a handicapped child is served
by a public agency other than the local educational agency, it is the state educational
agency which is "ultimately responsible for ensuring that each agency in the State is in
compliance with the IEP requirements and other provisions of the Act and regula-
tions." IEP Requirements, supra note 74, at 103:44 (Question #1 ). The state educa-
tional agency is given responsibility for all educational programs in 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6)
(1982) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 (1984). See supra note 60 and accompanying text for
the rationale behind this centralized responsibility. But compare IEP Requirements,
supra note 74, at 103:48 (Question #11).
80. 34 C.F.R. § 300.344 (1984). See IEP Requirements, supra note 74, at 103:49-51
(Questions ##13-25) for policy interpretations pertaining to attendance at IEP
meetings.
81. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.345 (1984). In addition to notice requirements, this regu-
lation also provides that "[i]f neither parent can attend [the IEP meeting], the public
agency shall use other methods to insure parent participation, including individual or
conference telephone calls." Id. § 300.345(c). See also supra note 55 and accompanying
text.
82. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.530-.534 (1984). If a child is suspected of having a spe-
cific learning disability, additional evaluation procedures are mandated. See id.
§§ 300.540-.543. Children with specific learning disabilities are defined as,
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Pursuant to regulation, the IEP must contain a "statement
of the child's present levels of educational performance,""3
both short-term and long-term goals, 84 a listing of the special
education85 and related services 6 to be provided to the child, 7
those children who have a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological
processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written,
which disorder may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak,
read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations. Such disorders include such
conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction,
dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. Such term does not include children who
have learning problems which are primarily the result of visual, hearing, or mo-
tor handicaps, of mental retardation, of emotional disturbance, or of environ-
mental, cultural, or economic disadvantage.
20 U.S.C. § 1401 (a) (15) (1982).
83. 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(a) (1984). Suggested elements of such a statement include
the effect of the child's handicap on both academic and nonacademic educational per-
formance, the results of objective diagnostic tests, and correlations between the child's
educational level and other aspects of the IEP. See IEP Requirements, supra note 74, at
103:55 (Question #36).
84. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.346 (b) (1984). The rationale behind the inclusion of
short-term objectives and annual goals, in addition to at least one annual review of the
IEP, is to provide a mechanism to determine:
(1) whether the anticipated outcomes for the child are being met (i.e., whether
the child is progressing in the special education program) and (2) whether the
placement and services are appropriate to the child's special learning needs. In
effect, these requirements provide a way for the child's teacher(s) and parents to
be able to track the child's progress in special education. However, the goals and
objectives in the IEP are not intended to be as specific as the goals and objectives
in daily, weekly, or monthly instructional plans.
JEP Requirements, supra note 74, at 103:56 (Question #37).
The distinction between annual goals and short-term objectives is not only one of
duration, but also of substance. Annual goals have been defined as "statements which
describe what a handicapped child can reasonably be expected to accomplish within a
twelve month period in the child's special education program." Id. (Question #38).
Short-term objectives, on the other hand, are "measurable, intermediate steps between a
handicapped child's present levels of educational performance and the annual goals that
are established for the child." The short-term objectives "serve as milestones for mea-
suring progress toward meeting the goals." Id. (Question #39).
85. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(c) (1984). Special education is instruction which has
been designed specifically, "at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs
of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical educa-
tion, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(16)(1982). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.14 (1984).
Because each public educational agency is under an obligation to provide a FAPE to
all handicapped children in its district, all special education and related services needed
by the child must be included in the IEP, "even if they are not directly available from
the local agency, and must be provided by the agency through contract or other ar-
rangements." IEP Requirements, supra note 74, at 103:57 (Question #44).
86. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.346 (c)(1984). The term "related services" includes:
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the extent to which the child will be mainstreamed, 88 the date
of implementation and duration,89 and a method of evalua-
tion.90 Although extensive evaluation procedures need only
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive serv-
ices (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical
and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling services, ex-
cept that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes
only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special
education, and includes the early identification and assessment of handicapping
conditions in children.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(17)(1982). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1984). For a discussion of the
controversies which have arisen pertaining to related services, see infra notes 140-47
and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 78 for a discussion of both the necessity and importance of an
individual determination of the amount and type of special education and related serv-
ices to be provided to each handicapped child.
88. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(c)(1984). The concept of mainstreaming is a result of
the congressional mandate that a handicapped child be placed in the least restrictive
environment possible. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5)(b) (1982). As a result, each public
agency has the obligation to insure:
(1) That to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children, including
children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated
with children who are not handicapped, and (2) That special classes, separate
schooling or other removal of handicapped children from the regular educa-
tional environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the handicap is
such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b)(1984). See Stark, supra note 75, at 482. See generally R. MAR-
TIN, supra note 12, at 85-95. See also infra note 131 (for a discussion of current issues
involving mainstreaming).
89. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(d)(1984). In general, the implementation of the IEP
must take place immediately after it is finalized. Two exceptions to this exist: "(I)
when the meetings occur during the summer or a vacation period, or (2) where there are
circumstances which require a short delay (e.g., working out transportation arrange-
ments)." Id. § 300.342 comment. Any such delay must be specified in the IEP. IEP
Requirements, supra note 74, at 103:46 (Question #4).
The usual duration of an IEP is twelve months. This is a direct reflection of the
short-term/annual goals structure required in an IEP. See supra note 84. In the event a
child requires a specific service for more than twelve months, it is possible to project an
IEP duration beyond that time period. The annual review and update required by regu-
lation (see supra note 74) still applies, however, resulting in an annual reconsideration of
the extended service duration. IEP Requirements, supra note 74, at 103:59 (Question
#53).
90. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(e)(1984). The method of evaluation must include
"[a]ppropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determin-
ing, on at least an annual basis, whether the short-term instructional objectives are be-
ing achieved." Id. For practical purposes, these evaluation components are usually
incorporated directly into the IEP objectives. See IEP Requirements, supra note 74, at
103:59 (Question #54). See also supra note 84.
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be conducted every three years,91 the child's IEP must be re-
viewed annually and updated as necessary.92
B. Procedural Protections
Procedural protections afforded to the parents of handi-
capped children generally fall within two broad categories. 93
First, the educational agency has an obligation to go great
lengths to achieve parental participation in preplacement eval-
uations.94 This includes elaborate notice requirements95 and
the necessity of gaining parental consent prior to an evalua-
tion or initial placement. 96
Second, a parent who is unhappy with any aspect of the
child's placement has the right to a full hearing on the mat-
ter 97 before an impartial hearing officer. 98  At the hearing,
either or both parties may be represented by counsel, 99 present
91. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(b)(1984). More frequent evaluations must be con-
ducted, however, "if conditions warrant or the child's parent or teacher requests an
evaluation." Id.
92. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
93. In enacting the EHA, Congress apparently expanded upon and subsequently
codified the broad procedural requirements which were generated by earlier court deci-
sions. Compare Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.
Supp. 279, 303-05 (E.D. Pa. 1972), [and] Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866,
880-81 (D.D.C. 1972), with 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982).
94. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. See Stark, supra note 75, at 483. See
also R. MARTIN, supra note 12, at 97-102, for a discussion of the stringent notice re-
quirements within the regulations.
95. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.505 (1984).
96. See id. § 300.504. Consent involves full disclosure to the parent of the circum-
stances in the parent's native language, a written agreement to the activity for which
consent is sought, and an understanding on the parent's part that the consent is volun-
tary and may be revoked at any time. Compare id. § 300.504 (b)(2) which clearly states
that "[e]xcept for preplacement evaluation and initial placement, consent may not be
required as a condition of any benefit to the parent or child" (emphasis added).
97. See 20 U.S.C.§ 1415(b)(2) (1982). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (1984). See
generally R. MARTIN, supra note 12, at 105-09, for a discussion of hearing
considerations.
98. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1982). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (1984),
which provides:
A hearing may not be conducted: (1) By a person who is an employee of a public
agency which is involved in the education or care of the child, or (2) By any
person having a personal or professional interest which would conflict with his
or her objectivity in the hearing.
Id.
99. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1982). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(a)(1) (1984). See
infra note 113 pertaining to the availability of attorneys fees as a remedy. See also S.
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evidence and cross-examine witnesses. 1°° Additionally, each
party has the right to obtain a record of the hearingus and
receive a written copy of the decision.10 2 The parents alone,
however, possess the right to determine whether the child in-
volved should be present at the hearing10 3 and whether the
hearing should be open to the public. l 4
The decision rendered by the hearing officer is final and
binding unless appealed.105 Any aggrieved party may appeal
the hearing officer's decision to the state educational
agency.106 If this occurs, the state agency conducts an impar-
tial review of the hearing and thereafter renders a completely
independent decision.107 This decision is once again final and
binding unless an aggrieved party subsequently files a corre-
sponding civil action.108
Throughout the entire process, the child who is the subject
of the controversy "must remain in his or her present educa-
tional placement."10 9 As a result, great concern exists to expe-
dite the hearing and subsequent proceedings so as not to
detrimentally affect the child's educational development. In
view of this, specific time guidelines have been established for
GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 35, for a discussion of the necessity of having counsel
present at the hearing.
100. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1982). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(a)(2) (1984). In
addition to the right to present evidence, both parties have the right to prevent the
introduction of evidence which had not been disclosed at least 5 days prior to hearing.
See id. § 300.508(a) (3). The regulations also afford each party the right to compel the
attendance of witnesses. See id. § 300.508(a) (2). For a discussion of problems which
may result from compelled witness attendance, see R. MARTiN, supra note 12, at 113-
15.
101. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1982). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.508 (a) (4) (1984).
102. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (d) (1982). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(a) (5) (1984).
In addition to the written decision, both parties also receive the findings of fact upon
which the hearing officer based the decision. Id.
103. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(b) (1) (1984).
104. See id. § 300.508(b) (2).
105. See id. § 300.509.
106. See id. § 300.510(a).
107. See id. § 300.510(b). A review by the state educational agency consists of an
examination of the hearing record, an evaluation of whether due process was afforded,
the hearing of any additional evidence deemed necessary to the determination, and, at
the discretion of the reviewing officer, an analysis of written and/or oral arguments. See
id. § 300.510(b) (1) - (4). The right to counsel continues to all parties at this stage. See
id. § 300.510 comment 2. See generally R. MARTIN, supra note 12, at 116-17.
108. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(c) (1984). See also id. § 300.511.
109. See id. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1982). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a) (1984).
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implementing the due process procedures,' time guidelines
which have proven to be quite unrealistic. This problem,
along with others that have evolved since the Act's imple-
menting will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.
IV. CURRENT ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE EHA
Not suprisingly, the two elements of the Act which most
concern parents of handicapped children have also been the
two largest generators of problems and controversies. Chal-
lenges to both the substantive content of educational pro-
grams and the requisite due process procedures have
produced much litigation.' As a result, the EHA has been
the victim of a wide range of interpretations. To date, the
United States Supreme Court has analyzed provisions of the
Act in only four instances."12 Two of these decisions1 3 at-
tempted to give practical meaning to the requirement of a
FAPE and will be discussed in the following pages, along with
other issues which have yet to reach the steps of the nation's
highest judiciary.
A. Free Appropriate Public Education
As discussed above, the intent of the EHA is to guarantee
a free appropriate public education to all handicapped chil-
dren. "' 4 Although the Act and regulations delineate proce-
dural steps for deriving a FAPE,1 5 nowhere are functional
standards set forth to determine when an education is, in fact,
"appropriate" to the educational needs of a handicapped
110. See id. § 300.512. A decision must be reached and mailed to each party
within 45 days of the receipt of a request for an initial hearing. If appealed, the state
educational agency then has 30 days to render and mail its decision. See id.
§ 300.512(a) - (b). An extension of these timelines may be granted at the request of
either party. See id. § 300.512(c).
I 1l. See Note, supra note 64, at 950-5 1. See also Ekstrand, Doctor, Do You Make
(School) House Calls?, CHILDREN TODAY, May-June, 1982, at 2, 3.
112. See Burlington v. Department of Educ., 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985); Smith v.
Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984); Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371
(1984); Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
113. The Smith case will not be discussed in this Comment. That case presented
several "questions regarding the award of attorneys fees in a proceeding to secure a 'free
appropriate public education' for a handicapped child." 104 S. Ct. at 3460.
The Burlington case, relating to procedural issues, is discussed infra note 160.
114. See supra notes 67, 71-72 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
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child. 116 It was this issue that the Supreme Court addressed in
Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education v. Rowley,' 1 7
the Court's first opportunity to interpret a provision of the
EHA.11 8
In Rowley, 1 9 the Court recognized that the definition of a
FAPE found within the Act "tends toward the cryptic rather
than the comprehensive,"1 20 providing very little guidance to
school administrators. Despite the fact that the definition it-
self was not very functional, the Court reasoned it was still the
principal tool provided by Congress for construing that "criti-
cal phrase of the Act."1 21 By analyzing this definition in con-
junction with the history of the Act,1 22 then the Court derived
116. As one author commented regarding the vagueness of the FAPE
requirements:
Attempts to attach a functional meaning to this elusive phrase have resulted in
the emergence of a broad spectrum of definitions. The minimal standard of self-
sufficiency suggests that an education program is appropriate if a child is taught
the skills essential to being independent. At the opposite end of this spectrum
are standards which suggest that 'free appropriate public education' is achieved
only if the goal is to optimize the child's development.
Note, supra note 64, at 951 (footnotes omitted). See also Note, supra note 43, at 1125.
117. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
118. See id. at 187. See generally Note, The Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act of 1975 Requires Beneficial, Not Equal, Educational Opportunity, 14 TEx.
TECH L. REv. 631 (1983).
119. Amy Rowley was an academically-gifted deaf student at the Furnace Woods
School in the Hendrick Hudson Central School District. During the fall of her first
grade year, an IEP was prepared for Amy that provided she would be educated in a
regular classroom with supplemental instruction from a tutor for the deaf and a speech
therapist. Amy's parents insisted that a qualified sign-language interpreter also be pres-
ent in all of her academic classes. The school administrators, after consulting with
various experts, concluded that a sign-language interpreter was not necessary.
The Rowleys then requested an impartial due process hearing, which resulted in a
decision in favor of the school district. This was affirmed by the state educational
agency. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York re-
versed, based on a determination that the denial of the sign-language interpreter pre-
cluded Amy from receiving " 'an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.' " The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit subsequently affirmed the District Court's decision. The
Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to review the decisions of the lower federal
courts. 458 U.S. at 184-86 (citing Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ., 483
F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y.), arf'd per curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and
remanded, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)).
120. 458 U.S. at 188.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 188-204. See generally supra notes 13-36 and accompanying text.
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what it considered to be a "tolerable" '123 standard for regulat-
ing the content of educational programs:
Insofar as a State is required to provide a handicapped child
with a "free appropriate public education," we hold that it
satisfies this requirement by providing personalized instruc-
tion with sufficient support services to permit the child to
benefit educationally from that instruction. Such instruction
and services must be provided at public expense, must meet
the State's educational standards, must approximate the
grade levels used in the State's regular education, and must
comport with the child's IEP. In addition, the IEP, and
therefore the personalized instruction, should be formulated
in accordance with the requirements of the Act and, if the
child is being educated in the regular classrooms of the pub-
lic education system, should be reasonably calculated to en-
able the child to achieve passing marks and advance from
grade to grade. 124
By so stating, the Court concluded that equal access, rather
than equal educational opportunity, was the goal of the
Act.125 The Court established a "basic floor of opportu-
nity"'126 which need only "be sufficient to confer some educa-
tional benefit upon the handicapped child."' 27 By attempting
123. See 458 U.S. at 203.
124. Id. at 203-04 (emphasis added).
125. See id. at 200. The Court reasoned:
The educational opportunities provided by our public school systems undoubt-
edly differ from student to student depending upon a myriad of factors that
might affect a particular student's ability to assimilate information presented in
the classroom. The requirement that States provide "equal" educational oppor-
tunities would thus seem to present an entirely unworkable standard requiring
impossible measurements and comparisons. Similarly, furnishing handicapped
children with only such services as are available to non-handicapped children
would in all probability fall short of the statutory requirement of "free appropri-
ate public education"; to require, on the other hand, the furnishing of every
special service necessary to maximize each child's potential is, we think, further
than Congress intended to go. Thus to speak in terms of "equal" services in one
instance gives less than what is required by the Act and in another instance
more. The theme of the Act is "free appropriate public education", a phrase
which is too complex to be captured by the word "equal" whether one is speak-
ing of opportunities or services.
Id. at 198-99. Cf Note, Attack on the EHA: The Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act After "Board of Education v. Rowley", 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 183, 190-
200 (1983).
126. 458 U.S. at 201.
127. Id. at 200 (emphasis added). In other words, "the requirement that a state
provide specialized educational services to handicapped children generates no addi-
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to derive a functional standard for the governance of
FAPEs, 128 the Court actually raised more questions than it
answered.
In the first place, although the Court did give meaning to
the Act's definition of a FAPE, it did so with another ambigu-
ous standard. 12 9 School officials and judges alike are now
faced with the problem of determining exactly how much edu-
cational benefit qualifies as the requisite "some."130 In addi-
tion, the Court failed to consider the effect of conflicting
professional opinions regarding educational benefits. 131  In
other words, given the proposition that a handicapped child
tional requirement that the services so provided be sufficient to maximize each child's
potential 'commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.' " Id. at 198.
128. The Court did attempt to restrict its holding to the facts of Rowley: "We do
not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational
benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act." Id. at 202. Lower courts,
however, have ignored this limitation and have consistently applied the Rowley ration-
ale to a myriad of fact situations. See, eg., Rettig v. Kent City School Dist., 720 F. 2d
463 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2379, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 3549 (1984);
Springdale School Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 927 (1983); Yaris v. Special School Dist., 558 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Mo. 1983), affid,
728 F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1984); Lang v. Braintree School Comm. 545 F. Supp. 1221 (D.
Mass. 1982).
129. One author observed:
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve the confusion surrounding the meaning
of FAPE; however, the scope of special education and related services has yet to
be clearly defined. Perhaps the Court intended that they be viewed with respect
to the requirements of a beneficial education. However, if this were true, the
Court generated more confusion in the area by failing to establish a test for de-
termining the adequacy of educational benefits.
Note, supra note 118, at 646.
130. See, eg., Frank v. Grover, 1982-83 E.H.L.R. DEC.554:148 (Wis. Cir. Ct.).
See also Comment, supra note 34, at 1058, in which the author stated: "Logically, a
point must come when the benefits a child reaps are so insubstantial that his education
cannot be termed 'appropriate' under any standards." See generally Note, supra note
64, at 950-53; Note, supra note 125, at 198-200.
131. See, eg., Hessler v. State Bd. of Educ., 700 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1983); In re
Daniel B., #45 (Aug. 2, 1983) (before the Wisconsin State Superintendent of Public
Instruction). See also Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education Em-
pirical Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L. REv. 40, 47 (1974), in which it is
concluded that "[t]he response to almost any interesting question concerning the educa-
tion of the handicapped is either that the answer is unknown or that no generalizable
beneficial effect of a given treatment can be demonstrated." Id. at 47. See generally S.
GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 25-28.
One of the leading areas of professional disagreement concerns the concept of main-
streaming, as mandated by the Act's least restrictive environment requirement. See
supra note 88. See, e.g., Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 104
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need not be provided with the best possible education, 132 there
exists no mechanism to determine between two lesser, but
equally beneficial, educational programs. In view of present
economic conditions and the increased cost of educating
handicapped children, 133 the minimum standard set forth by
the Supreme Court in Rowley is clearly both realistic and war-
ranted. In response, however, Congress must now act to
amend the EHA to include substantive guidelines for follow-
ing the dictates of the Court.1 3 1
S. Ct. 196 (1983). See also Case-In-Point, "Mainstreaming - What is Appropriate?", 5
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 17 (1984).
The "movement toward increased integration of handicapped students into regular
classrooms" began in the sixties and early seventies as a result of the questionable effec-
tiveness of educating handicapped children in separate classrooms. Note, supra note 43,
at 1119. Special educators began to realize that the minor short-term benefits of segre-
gation were greatly outweighed by the long-term benefits of mainstreaming, which in-
clude increased socialization, decreased stigmatization, a more positive self-image, a
more advanced curriculum and more diverse educational opportunity. R. MARTIN,
supra note 12, at 86-89. See generally Kesselman-Turkel & Peterson, Taking the Tough
Route of Fairness, AM. EDUC., Jan.-Feb., 1981, at 6.
More recently, however, the concept of mainstreaming has encountered much criti-
cism. Specialists fear that mainstrearning may place impossible demands upon the
teacher and eventually lead to the neglect of all students in the classroom. Additionally,
it is feared that necessary funds may be diverted from programs which would be more
beneficial to a handicapped child. "Others have argued that the isolation resulting from
being 'different' in a class where others are perceived as 'normal' can be more damaging
than the stigma of separation." Note, supra note 43, at 1121.
132. See supra note 127.
133. The preference for "equal access" over "equal opportunity" (supra note 125
and accompanying text) was a direct result of the questionable availability of sufficient
funds" 'to finance all of the services and programs that are needed and desirable in the
system. . . .'" Rowley, 458 U.S. at 199 (citing Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp.
866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972)).
See Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1984), where the
court discussed the effect of monetary factors on educational programs:
Noticeably absent from the Act is any requirement that the [Department of Edu-
cation (DOE)] provide the best possible education for the eligible handicapped
child. Because budgetary constraints limit resources that realistically can be
committed to these special programs, the DOE is required to make only those
efforts to accomodate Katherine's needs that are "within reason".
Id. at 813 (citing Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 455 (3d Cir.
1981), cerL denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982)). See also Comment, supra note 34, at 1045, in
which the author points out: "The fiscal pressures of today's economy have imposed
restraints upon the progress being made toward fulfilling the goal of a 'free appropriate
public education.'"
134. Possibilities include mandating the development of IEPs which are reasonably
calculated to achieve set minimum gains on certain objective tests, better utilization of
the grading and advancement system currently used in public education, and more ex-
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Obviously, the strongest dictate emanating from Rowley is
the requirement of an "educational benefit" as a necessary ele-
ment of a FAPE.1 35 The Court neglected to define, though,
what exactly contitutes "education" so as to give rise to an
educational benefit. 136 However saddening it may be, "there is
a category of mentally disabled children so severely impaired
as to be unable to absorb or benefit from education." a13 7
When, due to the severity of a handicap, a child is mentally
not able to learn, it would seem that the school district should
no longer be under an obligation to teach.1 38 Neither the Act
nor Rowley, however, resolves this issue. As a result, lower
court judges and hearing officers have differed in their re-
sponses.1 39 A clear congressional definition of education is of
utmost importance, then, as it would serve to guarantee the
proper utilization of limited special education resources by as-
suring that high paid professional educators are not trans-
formed into high paid professional babysitters.
Another issue which has emerged from the Rowley defini-
tion of a FAPE concerns the extent to which related serv-
ices' 40 must be included in a child's educational program. In
1984, the United States Supreme Court encountered a second
opportunity to interpret the EHA in Irving Independent
School District v. Tatro.141 There the Court was faced with the
issue of whether clean intermittent catheterization (CIC) was
a "related service" as defined by the EHA.142 The Court de-
termined CIC satisfied the necessary requirements of the Act's
plicit standards for determining the amount of mainstreaming to be provided based on
objective physical, psychological and educational analyses.
135. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
136. The Act, too, is ambiguous in this regard. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
137. Levine v. Institution & Agencies Dept., 84 N.J. 234, _, 418 A.2d 229, 237
(1980).
138. See, eg., Department of Mental Hygiene v. Dolan, 89 Misc. 2d 1003, 392
N.Y.S.2d 980 (Civ. Ct. 1977), in which the court concluded that "[e]fforts to develop
the capacities of a mentally retarded child to the fullest extent possible may be educa-
tion in the philosophical sense but it is not education in the legislative sense." Id. at
1006, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
139. Compare In re Board of Educ., 1980-81 E.H.L.R. DEC. 502:315, with In re
School Dist. 1983-84 E.H.L.R. DEC. 505:220.
140. See supra note 86.
141. 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984).
142. See id. at 3376. Amber Tatro was an eight year old girl born with a defect
known as spina bifida. As a result, she is unable to empty her bladder voluntarily.
Consequently, CIC, a procedure to drain the bladder, had been prescribed. Although
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definition, 14 3 thereby imposing an obligation on the school dis-
trict to provide the service as part of the child's FAPE. 144
In so concluding, the Court established several limitations
on the provision of related services. 145  The greatest of these
cautions that "only those services necessary to aid a handi-
capped child to benefit from special education must be pro-
vided." 146 Once again, the Court set forth a legally sound,
theoretical standard, but failed to devise concrete, substantive
guidelines to aid special educators in determining when a ser-
vice does, in fact, benefit a child's education. 147
The EHA was enacted with the intent of allowing the state
much leeway in the formation of substantive requirements.48
The time has come, however, for Congress to withdraw some
this procedure has to be performed every three to four hours, Amber's IEP made no
provision for school personnel to administer the CIC.
After unsuccessfully pursuing administrative remedies to secure CIC services, Am-
ber's parents filed an action in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
The district court "concluded that CIC was not a 'related service' under the Education
of the Handicapped Act because it did not serve a need arising from the effort to edu-
cate." This decision was reversed on appeal and remanded to the district court. The
district court, after hearing additional evidence, determined that CIC was a related ser-
vice under the Act. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision.
Upon appeal by the school district, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 3374-
76.
143. The Court analyzed two aspects of the definition of "related services": "first,
whether CIC is a 'supportive servic[e] ...required to assist a handicapped child to
benefit from special education'; and second, whether CIC is excluded from this defini-
tion as a 'medical servic[e]' serving purposes other than diagnosis or evaluation." Id. at
3376. The Court initially determined CIC was, in fact, a supportive service: "A service
that enables a handicapped child to remain at school during the day is an important
means of providing the child with the meaningful access to education that Congress
envisioned." Id. at 3377. The Court then concluded that CIC was not a medical ser-
vice, as medical services must be provided by a physician. Because CIC could be ad-
ministered by a nurse or even a layman with minimal training, it clearly did not fall
within the medical services category. Id. at 3377-79.
144. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (18) (1982) provides that a FAPE includes both special edu-
cation and related services. See 104 S. Ct. at 3376.
145. 104 S. Ct. at 3379.
146. Id. Other limitations involve the caveat that a child must be handicapped
before special education and related services need to be provided, the fact that only CIC
services and not equipment were being requested, and a reemphasis of the fact that
services required to be performed by a physician do not have to be provided. See id.
147. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text pertaining to the controversial
"educational benefit" requirement. See also supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text
regarding the ambiguous concept of "education."
148. See S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 13, at 16-17, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1440-41. See also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 183.
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of this responsibility and provide more workable guidelines
within the federal format. Because state funding is tied di-
rectly to compliance with federal regulations, 14 9 both state leg-
islators and, worse yet, school officials are left with the
problem of trying to foresee what types of substantive require-
ments will withstand federal scrutiny. More comprehensive
federal regulations would provide greater certainty to educa-
tors, decrease the amount of interpretive litigation, and ulti-
mately reflect in a beneficial manner on the educational
programs being provided to handicapped children.
B. Procedural Protections
One of the goals of the EHA was to provide procedural
safeguards to parents in all matters relating to their child's
educational process. 150 This goal has manifested itself in elab-
orate notice requirements, 151 the opportunity to examine
records, 52 prerequisites of parental participation and con-
sent, 1 53 and extensive review procedures.1 54  Clearly, parental
safeguards are essential due to the disparate positions held by
parents and school districts.1 55  Just because the district con-
trols the pursestrings and employs the professionals, however,
does not eliminate the need, in some instances, to be able to
enforce parental cooperation.
149. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 43, at
1110, in which the author observes:
Of course, clearer substantive guidelines would not add more dollars to the
budget or more hours to the administrator's day. But a local official is less likely
to ignore a clear statutory mandate - violation of which could threaten the re-
ceipt of federal funds - than to bend flexible rules. Moreover, the threat of a
parental complaint would be more credible where clear regulations made it ap-
parent that the child's rights were being denied.
Id. (footnote omitted).
150. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 95.
152. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (1984).
153. See supra notes 94, 96 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
155. One author noted that "[tihe due process procedures. . . exist to balance the
inequality of bargaining position that exists between parents and education professionals
by virtue of the latter's professional knowledge, institutional position, and larger re-
source base." Comment, Compensatory Educational Services and the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1469, 1473-74.
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It is not as rare as one might think that parents refuse to
cooperate in some manner in the development of their child's
educational program. Whether it be the withholding of con-
sent for preplacement evaluations 156 or the unilateral removal
of the child from his current placement, 157 uncooperative ac-
tions on the part of parents both stymie the district adminis-
trators and detrimentally affect the child's education
progress. 15  As the Act reads today, the school district must
initiate a full-blown hearing in order to gain parental coopera-
tion. 59 For relatively minor things, such as obtaining consent
to a preplacement evaluation, it would seem that less costly
and more educationally advantageous options could be
devised.
Just as parental non-compliance is harmful to the educa-
tional development of handicapped children, so too is stagna-
tion at an improper placement due to pending reviews or
appeals. As mentioned above, throughout the challenge pro-
cess, the child who is the subject of the controversy is required
to remain in his current educational placement. 16° Although
156. See, eg., Dubois v. Connecticut State Bd. of Educ., 727 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1984).
157. See, eg., Rowe v. Henry County School Bd., 718 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1983).
158. See, eg., Roe v. Milford School Comm., No. 80-1702-Z, slip op. at - (D.
Mass. Feb. 4, 1983) ("Without the parents' cooperation and genuine desire to work out
a satisfactory plan, the procedural requirement is nothing more than an empty ritual
generating paper without hope of meaningful results.")
159. 34 C.F.R. § 300.506(a) (1984).
160. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. The parents of a handicapped
child were recently given a great financial incentive for maintaining their child's current
placement during an appeal. The United States Supreme Court in Burlington v. De-
partment of Educ., 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985) determined that:
parents who unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency of
review proceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials, do so at
their own financial risk. If the courts ultimately determine that the IEP pro-
posed by the school officials was appropriate, the parents would be barred from
obtaining reimbursement for any interim period in which their child's placement
violated [20 U.S.C.] § 1415(e)(3).
Id. at 2005.
This decision has placed the parents of a handicapped child whose placement is
considered inappropriate in an extremely uncomfortable position. They are now faced
with determining whether to risk potential damage to their child's educational progress
by maintaining the current placement or, in the alternative, risk a potentially large fi-
nancial loss by unilaterally altering what is later determined to be an appropriate place-
ment.
The Court failed to specifically resolve this predicament. It can be presumed in view
of its earlier discussion of the reimbursement issue, however, see id. at 2002-03 and infra
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strict time guidelines have been established for each segment
of the due process procedures, 161 compliance is usually the ex-
ception rather than the rule. 162 This appears to be the result
of unrealistically short time requirements in the first place,163
augmented by increased litigation of EHA claims.164
Longer timeframes are clearly not the answer, as the result
would be an equal, if not greater, stagnation period for the
child. Rather, the answer lies in reducing the number of pa-
rental challenges that reach the hearing and post-hearing
stages. One method of doing this which has met with great
success on a voluntary basis is the implementation of media-
tion prior to the hearing. 16  Although currently not required
note 162, that the Court felt this was the least offensive in terms of trying to square the
child's right to afree appropriate public education with Congress's mandate that a child
remain in his current placement pending appeal. This mandate was, in essence, an at-
tempt to stymie the "widespread practice of relegating handicapped children to private
institutions or warehousing them in special classes." Id. at 2005. The Court apparently
felt the financial risk involved in the parents'decision to unilaterally place their child
would help to safeguard against this practice.
161. See supra note 110.
162. See, eg., Mark R. v. Board of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affid,
705 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1983). The United States Supreme Court recognized this prob-
lem in the Burlington case. In determining whether the EHA required reimbursement to
parents for a private school placement when the public school offering is deemed to be
inappropriate, the Court employed in its decision the fact that "[a] final judicial decision
on the merits of an IEP will in most instances come a year or more after the school term
covered by that IEP has passed." 105 S. Ct. at 2003.
In view of this, the Court determined that the Act required the reimbursement of
parents who have schooled their child privately when they were faced with inappropri-
ate public school placement. Reimbursement was viewed as an essential element of "the
child's right to afree appropriate public education, the parents' right to participate fully
in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards." Id. (emphasis in the
original). Without reimbursement, "it would be an empty victory to have a court tell
them several years later that they were right but that these expenditures could not in a
proper case be reimbursed by the school officials." Id.
163. See supra note 110. Given the regulatory language, it is easy to see why these
time guidelines are rarely honored. For instance, to render a decision within 45 days of
the receipt of a hearing request could very well be humanly impossible, especially in
view of the hearing rights set forth in 34 C.F.R. § 300.508 (1984). See also supra notes
99-104 and accompanying text. Not only must time be taken to select a hearing officer
and assemble necessary witnesses and evidence, but a typical briefing schedule alone
would nearly deplete the 45 days allowed. This would leave little or no time for the
hearing officer to make a rational and educated decision concerning the child's future.
This seems completely contrary to the congressional intent of providing the due process
procedures to guarantee the child's receipt of a FAPE.
164. See supra note 111.
165. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 comment (1984). See generally M. BUDOFF and A.
ORENSTEIN, DUE PROCESS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: ON GOING TO A HEARING 305-
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by regulation, mediation, when utilized, often "leads to reso-
lution of differences between parents and agencies without the
development of an adversarial relationship and with minimal
emotional stress." 166 Given its high success rate, in addition
to its positive relationship and emotional effects, Congress
should seriously consider requiring each state to provide me-
diation as an interim dispute resolution mechanism.
V. CONCLUSION
The determined efforts of both parents and legislators over
ten years ago have resulted in millions of handicapped chil-
dren gaining access to an educational system that had previ-
ously ignored them completely. These children are now being
provided with professional instruction and special services
geared specifically to their educational needs. Many have also
been successfully mainstreamed into regular classes, to the
benefit of handicapped children and regular students alike.
Obviously, no federal legislation is, or could ever hope to
be, completely free of problems or controversies. In addition
to discussing the history, intent and substance of the EHA,
this Comment has focused directly on a few 1 67 of the problem
07 (1982), discussing "The Need for Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures." The
numerous benefits of negotiation in general, and mediation specifically, are set forth.
These benefits are summarized by the following excerpt:
Whereas law operates as a judgment upon acts, the negotiation process is di-
rected toward helping persons with ongoing relationships meet contingencies for
which rules may not provide explicit solutions. The central quality of the negoti-
ation is its capacity to reorient parties toward each other by helping them to
achieve a new shared perception of their interaction and by assisting in the devel-
opment of a program acceptable to both sides.
Id. at 306.
166. Id. See also R. MARTIN, supra note 12, at 109, for a discussion of mediation:
There are two reasons why mediation is a workable alternative to a full impartial
hearing. First, many parents who complain to schools are not taken seriously.
No one in authority will listen to them. But with the threat of an impartial
hearing, a mediator will suddenly listen. Some percentage of the complaints will
be found to be reasonable and mediation will work because someone finally paid
attention. Second, in many meetings in which the school does not agree with the
parents' complaint there is no incentive for schools to bend over backwards. But
under the threat of a full impartial hearing if the mediation fails, the school will
make extra efforts to work out something reasonable.
Id.
167. Obviously, a critique such as this could not be all encompassing. For further
discussions of special education issues, see generally supra note 131; S. GOLDBERG,
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areas which have surfaced since the Act's implementation in
1975. In particular, this Comment has analyzed the ambigu-
ity problems inherent in the requirements of a FAPE and re-
lated services. In addition, several of the Act's procedural
deficiencies were identified and discussed. Congress must now
take action and amend the EHA to alleviate these problems.
Failure to do so will ultimately harm the very same educa-
tional programs the Act was designed to protect.
KATHRYN M. COATES
supra note 17, at 83-117; Stark, supra note 75, at 487-504; Note, The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act: Opening the Schoolhouse Door, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 43, 50-58 (1976).
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